When voting on multiple agendas, allow voters to change the “weight of their votes per agenda item based on their interests” rather than the general “one person, one agenda item, one vote” mechanism design.
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While participants do not play exactly as game-theoretic equilibrium would predict, voting is generally linearly proportional to some noisy value, leading to much closer to optimal results than 1p1v (1 person 1 vote, one vote per person).
What is Quadratic Voting, a hot topic in digital democracy?”
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