Quadratic Payments: A Primer

Quadratic Payments: A Primer(Vitalik 2019)

One man, one vote. One man, N votes.

• But to get the Nth vote, you have to pay N dollars.
• People who feel their vote is worth twice as much will buy until the price is twice as high.
  • Note: TheCap on disposable income がないことが前提
• So, the value that each individual perceives in a vote matches the number of votes they get.

Private goods are contrasted with public goods.

• The term “[public goods (i.e. goods or services such as parks or highways)” here does not mean “what the national or local government does”
  • The focus is on the receiver, not the creator.
    • When one private, physical good (e.g., an apple) is produced, there is essentially one person who receives it.
    • Infrastructure such as roads and other digital goods that are inexpensive to replicate will have a large number of recipients.
      • In this case, the mechanism of the transaction, which assumes that there is only one recipient, does not work
  • Open source software is a public good
  • This commentary article is also a public good
• Goods with this type of nature cannot break down decision-making into individual units.

  • In the case of private goods, the problem is simple because it can be broken down into a series of decisions by each individual. The amount each person is willing to pay is what is produced for that person. But in the case of public goods, they cannot be “decomposed,” so people’s preferences must be added together in a different way.

  • The multitude of recipients makes it impossible to break it down into individual decisions.

Quadratic Voting: Quadratic Voting: How Mechanism Design Can Radicalize Democracy

• Within the organizational context, decision-making is a public good. This is because everyone “consumes” the consequences of the same decision.

  • Quadratic Voting

• Quadratic Voting can be applied to multiple-choice voting. - strategicity has

  • Really?信任投票だからということ？
    • The explanation he’s writing is a little strange because it’s a strategic maneuver.

• Can be applied to continuous value voting.

  • You could use it, but the benefits would be subtle because the utility is not linear with respect to the change in value.
    • Someone who wants to change the air conditioning setting from 28 degrees to 27 degrees is not necessarily happy with 18 degrees.
    • I don’t want to spend 100 credits to vote -10 if I don’t want it to be 18 degrees.

Quadratic Funding: Liberal Radicalism: A Flexible Design For Philanthropic Matching Funds Weaknesses of the second round of voting

• No built-in mechanism to determine voting content
  • Deciding what to vote for is a source of power.
  • Repeatedly propose decisions that are weakly approved by the majority and strongly disapproved by the minority, and continue to propose them until the minority runs out of voting tokens
    • (The minority runs out of tokens much faster than the majority) An example of an implementation where the decision-making choices themselves are part of the mechanism itself is Quadratic Funding.
• This is specific to the particular use case of private provision of public goods.

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