Quadratic Voting and Organizational Voting
For example, suppose a powerful person controls a minority population and orders them to
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1 Accumulate without using Credit for voting
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2 Use all your voting credits to vote when you give the order.
I think there is a risk that the results could be manipulated more powerfully by “organizational votes” than the current one-person, one-vote rule. https://recurrentist.info/オークションラボの第%EF%BC%98回ワークショップ%E3%80%8C投票/ Quadratic Voting
@OchaDukeNOP: this is interesting. I wonder if the more one-pointed organizational votes will be worth less. (Of course, it is possible to agree on a detailed ballot measure.) I would like to see the difference from the existing voting results by experimenting with a party with a small number of solid members.
BoufrawFrodo2 Actually, the opposite is true, QV reinforces the organized vote, a vote that values one vote of 100 organized people more heavily than 100 votes of one person. Since it is a method. This works well in the case of delegated voting, because it can be adjusted so that the proposal with the support of more parties passes, rather than the proposal put in by the representative of the party with the most vote power. BoufrawFrodo2 In other words, it is suited for decision making among plural groups, and a type of QV where one person has a certain number of votes may not QVs where one person has a certain number of votes may not work well.
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