[Elinor Ostrom - Wikipedia https://ja.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E3%82%A8%E3%83%AA%E3%83%8E%E3%82%A2%E3%83%BB%E3%82%AA%E3%82%B9%E3%83%88%E3%83% AD%E3%83%A0] Elinor Ostrom.
Ostrom studied public goods (i.e. goods or services such as parks or highways) and shared resources (CPR, Common-pool resource). He challenged the earlier assertion that either the government or the market would deal with the management of public goods and CPRs, and showed that the efficiency of managing resources is most effective when neither the market nor the government, but the community, plays a complementary role.
Ostrom argued that in the self-management of public goods and CPRs (self-governance), long-lasting institutions have the following design principles.
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Boundary: The boundary between the CPR and the individuals or their households who draw resources from the CPR is clear.
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Harmonization with local conditions: Proprietary rules are harmonized with supply rules.
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Collective Choice Arrangements: The majority of individuals affected by an operating rule can participate in modifying it.
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Surveillance: Surveillance personnel inspecting CPR conditions and proprietary persons are responsible for proprietary persons.
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Gradual sanctions: Proprietary owners who violate the operating rules will be sanctioned.
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Dispute resolution: Inexpensive local area contact to resolve disputes between proprietary parties or between proprietary parties and authorities.
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Recognition of the right to organize: The proprietary right to establish institutions cannot be challenged by outside government authorities.
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Embedded undertakings: For CPRs that are part of a larger system, proprietary, supply, monitoring, enforcement, and dispute resolution rules are organized in a multi-layered undertaking.
The study revealed that common resources (commons) such as forests and lakes can be managed efficiently in field environments, including the self-management of groundwater in Los Angeles, and in experimental settings using game theory. Studies that explain cooperative behavior of self-management with repetitive games are also related to the self-organization of institutions.
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1: The boundaries of the commons are clear.
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2: The rules for the use and maintenance of the commons are in harmony with local conditions
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3: The ability of members to participate in group decisions
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4 Monitoring of compliance with rules is in place.
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5 Penalties for violations are to be made in stages.
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6 Dispute resolution mechanisms in place
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7 The rights are approved by the entity organizing the commons.
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8 Nested organization of commons
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