- Business applications of micro-economics that win through [mechanism design - Toyotaka Sakai , Auction Lab (2020)
It was vertically written, a book that looked like a transcript of a talking book.
Sellers have no idea whatâs going on in the buyerâs head.
- = [information asymmetry
- Thatâs where we gather information at the auction.
Auction, image mixed
- Bid up, bid down
- sealed type
- First price, second price
second price
- strategicity
What are the benefits to the seller?
- I donât know in general.
The second price system has only been taught in economics departments for the last 20 years.
Relationship between bidding and second price
- Match in standard model
- Effects of Heat-Up
- Humans are emotionally capable of bidding more than their pre-assessed value.
- Wanting to win, resistance to not getting it
- About 10-15% of experimental subjects heat up.
- The authorâs impression is that itâs not just people who are emotionally heated up, but also people who lack knowledge or strongly believe in something else and calmly choose to act in a damaging way.
- Heat-up does not occur in the sealed type.
- Humans are emotionally capable of bidding more than their pre-assessed value.
- update
- Update your own evaluation by looking at othersâ evaluations
I donât want them to say, âI donât want to pay for itâ after the auction results.
- Good if executed automatically â Smart Contracts
Auction operator fishes
- shill bidding
- If itâs first price, the bidder pays his bid, no problem.
- With a second price, a price-fixing attack could be established by the operator looking at the winning bid of a potential bidder and bidding slightly below that amount.
Auction of coins issued
- Issuance of financial instruments
- Primary and secondary markets
- Primary market is auction oriented, because the appropriate price is unknown.
- IPOs are primary but not auctioned.
- Equity secondary market auctions
- Whoever gets the highest price can buy it.
- No auctioning off fish at the supermarket.
- Low unit price
- No day-to-day = significant disadvantages of taking longer to trade.
- government bonds
- Primary Market: JGB Auction by MOF Finance Bureau
- Secondary market: BOJ is buying.
- Multiple Homogeneous Goods Auction
- Bid Payment Method
- Same as the first price method when a single good
- [Contrast with uniform pricing, also called discriminatory pricing.
- Same as the first price method when a single good
- Uniform price method, runner-up price method
- Cheapest winning bid OR most expensive losing bid
- Not strategically resistant.
- Honesty gains with strategy resistance = lower decision-making costs for bidders.
- Vickrey method
- Pay the maximum on losing bids other than your own.
- Bid Payment Method
Bidding by English clock
- Prices go up, each person wants less.
- End at the point where the sum of demand is less than supply.
- Experimental results prone to higher prices
Example of financier
- Auction design to avoid unsold items
- Bid the amount you want to pay.
- The amount of money collected on the clock goes down.
- Ends with a match.
Real Estate Auction Examples
- 10-minute rule
- Ends 10 minutes after the last bid.
- To avoid being inundated with deadlines
- Real estate auctions were lifted in 1999.
- Bidding down auction of unsold items from post-bubble cleanup
- Bidding down is viable with only one buyer, but bidding up is at the lowest price.
- This is due to the fact that the buyer is not informed that âthe buyer is aloneâ.
Auctions are easy to get [understanding
- Price accountability
- Transparency in the decision-making process contributes to conviction.
Simultaneous Bidding Auction
- I want to combine different goods for sale.
- Selling two houses, want one but donât need two.
- Frequency Auction
- Individual Auctions
- Keep accepting bids until everything stops. sequential auction
- unfavorable
stable matching - Acceptance withholding algorithm - Gale-Shapley algorithm - Meet the strategic resistance: Honesty pays off!
- Difficult to rank when the number of people increases
- Youâll have to rank them by their grades.
- Simultaneous bidding auctions and acceptance withholding algorithms are generalized acceptance withholding algorithm.
Dormitory room exchange
- Top Trading Cycle Algorithm
- Pareto improvement
- Application to renal transplantation
The ability to rate well leads to ease of application of matching theory.
voting
-
Quadratic Voting
-
Can reflect strength of preference
-
A certain amount of credits are distributed.
-
There are multiple themes for the ballot.
-
Distribute credits on a theme.
- You get 10 votes for 100 credits.
-
Will be used in Colorado.
-
Why or how itâs good hasnât been proven.
-
majority judgment
- Ordinary majority rule is vulnerable to vote splitting.
- MJ will solve this problem.
- For example, rate each candidate on a 7-point scale
- The median value is the candidateâs social rating
- A two-step process is called an endorsement vote.
- MJ positioned as an improved version of the endorsement vote
- 2011
- Until this came out, majority rule with a deciding vote and the Boulder Rule were being discussed.
- Why choose the median?
- Strong strategic operation
- Itâs proven (what exactly?).
- More information than choosing one.
- Candidate Correlations
- A few ardent fans/weakly supported by many.
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