“person” in personology refers to a subject who has a right to life, not to a person who is equal to a human being.
Turi posed the question, “What kind of entity is recognized as a rightful subject with personality?” and in response, he argued that a person (person) with a rightful subject is one that satisfies the following conditions.
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Long-term sense of self, memory, and self-identity
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Consciousness and ability to think rationally
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Wanting the subject of the right
Following this definition would mean that many animals would be parsons, whereas fetuses, infants, brain-dead patients, and ignorant people would not meet the definition of parsons. What is the Person Theory? a simple explanation of a representative argument that clarifies the subject matter of rights｜Liberal Arts Guide []](https://liberal-arts-guide.com/person-theory/)
→ Reasons for “Correctness” p.146
from /villagepump/personalism. What are the conditions for being a “human (Homo sapiens)” with each type of “right”?
“Person Theory” Common Misconceptions (1) Person Theory is utilitarian | Eguchi’s Non-Religious Laboratory - bioethics - What are the conditions for being a “human (Homo sapiens)” with each type of “right”? - Michael Tooley’s article “Abortion and neonatal killing” - Mary Ann Warren, “Legal and Moral Status of Abortion” - Both of the above papers were translated in the book “Bioethics of Abortion”.
- I myselfabortion にはあまり興味がないが、なるほどここに繋がるのか感
- [If killing fetus is not the abortion equivalent of murder, then what separates a fetus from a person?
- Allowing abortion = not recognizing the fetus as a person
- The fetus is fully genetically homo sapiens.
- Allowing abortion = not recognizing the fetus as a person
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The argument used in the so-called “parson argument” is, as I understand it, as follows.
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(1) We treat “persons” as special. Or, we are forced to treat them specially. (Fact)
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(2) If special treatment is to be given, the reason for that special treatment needs to be made clear. (Requirements in rationality and moral thinking)
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(3) If humans (Homo sapiens) are to be given special treatment, it is necessary to appeal to the traits that make humans different from other animals.
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(4) The fact that we are human (Homo sapiens) is not the reason. You need to show why Homo sapiens is special.
- Why [Homo sapiens is special.
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(5) Candidates include language use and self-consciousness. There can be others.
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(6) Whatever the case may be, if the standard is a reason to change the treatment of “people” and other entities that are given special treatment, then the standard should be applied to non-human entities as well.
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Many Parsonists use “self-consciousness” and “advanced intelligence” as reasons for special treatment, but of course one can question that… It is merely a suggestion.
- Michael Tooley, “Abortion and Neonatal Killing.”
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In order to have a “right to life,” one must have a “desire to sustain one’s own life.
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To do so, one must have the concept of “sustaining one’s own life” or, more precisely, the concept of a “sustaining self.
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This argument has been reviewed by many ethicists and is not considered very successful.
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- Michael Tooley, “Abortion and Neonatal Killing.”
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The only people who still insist on parsons are those who are trying to argue somehow with right under natural law or something like that.
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Personalism is basically
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(1) It is fundamental to moral thinking that we should treat things the same, and if we don’t treat things the same, we should make clear the basis for that.
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(2) We give parsons special treatment among living things.
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(3) If you are going to give parsons special treatment, give them that feature.
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(4) Apparently, the only thing that makes a person special is psychological traits.
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If you want to defeat the person theory, you can attack exactly this (2). In other words, you can argue that it doesn’t really matter morally whether you are a person or not. And this is (as I understand it) the basic idea of Peter Singer, who is (for some reason) abhorred in Japan as a “personist.
Parson Theory Afterwards / Moral Status | A Certain Eguchi’s Laboratory of Uncertainty
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Well, the question of whether a person is a person or not and what is the criterion is already old-fashioned… Since about 2000, I think it is more common to discuss what kind of (moral) value each life has, in the form of moral status or moral standing, rather than to think of personhood in a dichotomous way.
- Mary Ann Warren
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A review of the various moral status criteria and a conclusion that it seems to have to be a mix of several principles.
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1: Principle of Respect for Life. Life should not be killed or destroyed without reason.
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2: Principle of Prohibition of Abuse. Even when there is a reason to kill, there should be no abuse or cruelty. Suffering should be minimized.
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3: principle of the moral agent. A being who can act morally (with reason) would still be of special value. Be it a ningen, a Martian, or a robot.
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4: human rights. After all, every human being has rights as a human being.
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5: interspecies principle. Even if the species is different from ours, we must give due consideration to them. In particular, pets and other beings that are closely related to humans should be given due consideration.
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6: Ecosystem Principles. Ecosystems should also be subject to moral considerations.
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7: Principle of the Transitional Rule of Respect. Consideration should be given in roughly the order listed above.
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